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A Quite Principled Conceit
A Response to Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by
Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L J 1372
(2013).

Kiel Brennan-Marquezt
I. PRINCIPLES
In The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual
Autonomy, Professor Jed Rubenfeld sets out to reinvent rape
law. Instead of resting on ideals of sexual autonomy-as it cur
rently stands-Professor Rubenfeld argues that rape law should
take root in a principle of self-possession. 1 The analysis proceeds
in four parts, all lucid, all deft.
First, Professor Rubenfeld argues that the ideal of sexual
autonomy cannot be squared with our intuition that rape-by
deception-sexual consent procured by lie or pretense (for ex
ample about one's marital status)-should not be a crime. 2 De
ception strips the deceived party of grounds on which to legally
consent. Therefore, if rape is defined as "nonconsensual sex,"
rape-by-deception is as odious as rape-by-force. 3 Yet, in Professor
Rubenfeld's words, "[m]any-perhaps most-of us don't think
'rape-by-deception' is rape at all." 4 This observation frames and
animates the rest of the article. It is a trenchant one.
Second, Professor Rubenfeld counsels that the way out of
the snare is to give up on sexual autonomy, not to criminalize

t

Academic Fellow, Orville H. Schell Jr Center for International Human Rights,
Yale Law School; JD 2011, Yale Law School. For improving the essay indispensably, I
thank Metom Bergman, Shishene Jing, Kara Loewentheil, Carly Zubrzycki, and the edi
tors at The University of Chicago Law Review; for advocating on the devil's behalf, Jamie
Brooks and Madhav Khosla. Surviving blemishes are my own.
1 Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autono
my, 122 Yale L J 1372, 1425 (2013).
2 See id at 1381-1406.
3 See, for example, id at 1403 ("[A] rape law genuinely committed to sexual auton
omy would reject the force requirement, defining rape solely in terms of consent. And if
rape is sex without consent, sex-by-deception ought to be rape.") (citation omitted). This
point is fortified by the existence of two exceptions to the rape law's general disregard for
rape-by-deception: first, medical misrepresentation; second, false impersonation of the
victim's husband. See id at 1395-98.
4 Id at 1376.
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rape-by-deception.5 Third, he suggests that sexual autonomy
should give way to an ideal of self-possession,6 and that rape
should be correspondingly defined as an act of violence that
"possess[es]" its victim in the same way as slavery and torture:
by rendering the victim's body no longer his or her own. 7 This
formulation would distinguish rape from other crimes involving
unwanted physical intrusion, insofar as "[a] rape victim's body is
taken over, invaded, occupied, taken control of-taken possession
of-in a fashion and to a degree not present in ordinary acts of
theft, robbery, [and] assault."8 And it would provide a conceptual
rationale for the "force requirement" in rape law-a requirement
that has been "much-maligned" over the years, though unduly
according to Professor Rubenfeld.9
With the core of his argument complete, Professor Rubenfeld concludes the article-in the last Part of the last Sectiono
by enumerating certain "uncomfortable results" to which the
self-possession theory leads." For example, the self-possession
theory probably requires us to say that when "a high school
principal [] threaten[s] to expel a seventeen-year-old student
unless she [has] sex with him," the resultant sex act does not
count as rape. 12 Likewise, many instances of intercourse that
begin with one party's refusal would not qualify as rape under
the self-possession theory, including the infamous Berkowitz
case, in which a male coed had sex with one of his classmates
despite her repeatedly saying "no" before and during intercourse. 13 Finally, the theory must accept as unproblematic cases
in which the victim is unconscious, asleep, or, in certain instances, intoxicated,14 cases that I suspect many readers consider
prime examples of rape.15

10

See Rubenfeld, 127 Yale L J at 1408-22 (cited in note 1).
See id at 1423-40.
Id at 1425-27.
Id at 1426.
Rubenfeld, 127 Yale L J at 1380 (cited in note 1).
See id at 1435-40.
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Id (acknowledging that this result "will not [] conform with many readers' intuitions"). See also State u Thompson, 792 P2d 1103, 1107 (Mont 1990).
13 See Rubenfeld, 127 Yale L J at 1438-39 (cited in note 1). See also Commonwealth
u Berkowitz, 641 A2d 1161, 1165 (Pa 1994).
14 See Rubenfeld, 127 Yale L J at 1440-42 (cited in note 1).
15 See, for example, Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication,
(In)capacity,and the Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 Akron L Rev 899, 904 (2008) (beginning from the premise that intoxication compromises consent, and therefore conditions sexual assault, and exploring how this premise applies to concrete doctrinal ques12
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As rich and provocative as the first three movements of Professor Rubenfeld's argument are, it is this fourth movement, the
final overture, that should give the careful reader pause. Once
the self-possession theory incorporates Professor Rubenfeld's caveats, his jaunt through the labyrinth leads right back to its
center: a principle of rape law that fails, in hard cases, to harmonize with intuition. The article begins by explaining why the
autonomy theory cannot be squared with widely-shared intuitions about rape. And it concludes by acknowledging that the
self-possession theory cannot be squared with widely-shared intuitions about rape. In short, both theories fail if success is defined, as Professor Rubenfeld seems to define it, as harmony between principles and preexisting intuitions.
To distinguish these portraits of failure, Professor Rubenfeld wants to persuade us that his self-possession theory is principled, if "unappealing[],"16 while the autonomy principle, in
light of the rape-by-deception riddle, is defunct. But there is
nothing intrinsically more principled about the self-possession
theory. It is principled insofar as we choose to apply it in a principled way. The autonomy theory, too, could be principled-if we
were willing to apply it so. But we are not. That's the whole
game. Professor Rubenfeld asks us to embrace the selfpossession principle even when its implications are grossly out
of sync with existing sensibilities.17 But he offers no account of
why we would do this, or even why we should do this. Two theories are on offer, both of which capture many instances of rape
but, if adopted with stoic rationality, would also lead to perverse
results. Why should we prefer one to the other? An independent
rationale is required to answer this question, but Professor
Rubenfeld, strangely enough, offers none. The article closes in
equipoise.

tions). See also generally Shlomit Wallerstein, A Drunken Consent Is Still Consent' or
Is It? A Critical Analysis of the Law on a Drunken Consent to Sex Following Bree, 73 J
Crim L 318 (August 2009) (exploring different understandings of consent under conditions of intoxication and arguing that intoxication should vitiate consent for the purposes
of rape law).
16 Rubenfeld, 122 Yale L J at 1438 (cited in note 1).
17 Id (claiming that he "see[s] no way out" of the uncomfortable outcomes to which
the self-possession theory leads).
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II. CONCEITS
Irresolution, ultimately, is not so grave a sin. The deeper
problem is that Professor Rubenfeld's argument assumes-but
never establishes why-rape law must be attached to one imperfect theory or the other. We need not abide this assumption. By
positing as a premise that a choice between flawed principles is
required, Professor Rubenfeld imagines into existence the very
problem he sets out to solve. Even if his argument successfully
fashions a solution-which I don't think it does, but supposing it
did-the enterprise was stillborn from the start.
Professor Rubenfeld's error has a clear, if subtle, genesis: he
misconstrues the force of his initial observation that the autonomy theory, if applied in a principled fashion, reaches rape-bydeception. If this observation holds-and Professor Rubenfeld
persuasively demonstrates that it does-the proper inference is
that rape-by-deception could be criminalized, not that it should
be. Whether rape-by-deception should be a crime is not a question that Professor Rubenfeld's observation, on its own, can resolve. It's precisely what his observation invites us to consider.
And having considered it, some of us will answer in the affirmative, and others of us-perhaps more-in the negative.18
I have trouble seeing what about this is lamentable. Different polities are free to set the parameters of categories like
"rape" as they see fit, and law is not so artless that it must disavow what its human stewards find obvious. When it comes to
the formulation of criminal statutes, there is no maxim that conceptual purity must trump human experience. In fact, the covenant of democratic politics could be described as exactly the opposite.19 If Professor Rubenfeld's point were that rape statutes
should be redrafted to explicate more precisely which acts they
reach, he might well be right.20 But that is not his point. Even if

18 Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld opens the article with examples of jurisdictions that
have decided to criminalize rape-by-deception (or at least reflect that commitment in
their legislative drafting). See id at 1375-76.
19 This may not be true in all legal fields. When law is judge created, rather than
legislative, there may be a stronger case to be made in favor of conceptual purity. The
most famous defense of this view is Ronald Dworkin's account of "integrity." See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard 1986). This view is highly contested, of
course. And it is Justice Holmes, perhaps, who best summarized the opposing view in his
svelte observation that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
O.W. Holmes Jr, The Common Law 1 (Little 1881).
20 Ironically, Professor Rubenfeld himself offers an excellent blueprint-in the idea
of "rape-by-coercion"-for the redrafting effort.
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rape statutes were so rewritten-to clarify, where appropriate,
that they exclude rape-by-deception-Professor Rubenfeld would
still condemn that solution as "unprincipled."21 Why? Because in
his view, we face a hard choice from which there is "no way
out,"22 requiring rape law to "pick its poison."23 Rape law can
stake its claim with sexual autonomy, or it can refrain from
criminalizing rape-by-deception, but not both at once-at least,
not without "contradict[ing] [] its own internal logic."24
Law, however, is not philosophy.25 We don't need to bear
down and accept every entailment of our first principles, however strained they become. The "contradiction"26 that Professor
Rubenfeld aims to resolve-that principle X could justify proscribing behavior A and behavior B, but its legal codification
proscribes only behavior A-is no contradiction at all. Nor is it
aberrant: law often stops short in this sense. We criminalize the
exchange of child pornography on the grounds that its production harms children.27 Giving this principle its due, we might
criminalize the exchange of soccer balls made in sweatshops.
Many jurisdictions allow for infliction of emotional distress torts
on the grounds that subjecting another person to mental suffering breaches a duty of care. 2 8 Taking this principle seriously,
there could also be a legal cause of action for heartbreak.29
In other words, there is nothing wrong with a democratic
polity's decision not to extend a principle across its full field of
possible applications. In practice, compromises are possible and
Rubenfeld, 122 Yale L J at 1380 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1438.
Id at 1380.
24 Id at 1412.
25 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 1029, 1031
(1990).
26 Rubenfeld, 122 Yale L J at 1380 (cited in note 1).
27 See, for example, New York u Ferber, 458 US 747, 758 (1982) (describing "the use
of children as subjects of pornographic materials" as "harmful to [their] physiological,
emotional, and mental health"). See also id at 758 n 9 (enumerating scholarly findings to
the same effect).
28 See, for example, Snyder u Phelps, 131 S Ct 1207, 1222-23 (2011) (Alito dissenting) (outlining the standards for and normative basis of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
29 In fact, some jurisdictions previously recognized this species of action: "amatory
torts." See Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and
Stereotyped Narrativesin Interspousal Torts, 19 Wm & Mary J Women & L 445, 467-74
(2013). The point is neither to laud nor to lament the disappearance of heartbreak suits
from tort law. The point is that our decision to disallow heartbreak suits, despite the fact
that tort law contemplates the possibility of such suits in theory, is not a contradiction. It
is just a choice.
21
22
23
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often wise, especially in a contentious setting like rape law.
Ironically enough, Professor Rubenfeld actually spends a good
deal of energy outlining a compromise position-one that strikes
an intuitive balance between his more wooden options-only to
dismiss it as "unprincipled" and "contradictory."30 The compromise would be to proscribe "coercive" rape, but not "deceptive"
rape, 31 thereby capturing our intuitions about the latter and, at
once, vindicating the ideal of sexual autonomy. Professor Rubenfeld acknowledges that this solution would strike a "happy medium," and that many readers are likely to find its results "appealing."32 Hollow vanities, those. In Professor Rubenfeld's view,
no matter how "desir[able]" the coercive-rape solution might
be,33 it lacks the cool analytic purity that a legal regime apparently demands. In his words:
Coercion is objectionable because a coerced "yes" does not
reflect a valid or genuine consent. But the same is true of a
deceived "yes." An anti-coercion principle is attractive because coerced sex is unconsented-to sex. But if unconsentedto sex is rape law's target, then deceptive sex ought to be
punished as well.34
But why? Is there something inherently amiss about a legal
world, shaped by the democratic process, in which sex-bycoercion is deemed rape, while sex-by-deception is not? Of course
not. In the last sentence above, Professor Rubenfeld slyly inserts
the word "ought," as though to underscore an everyday normative judgment. But Professor Rubenfeld is not using "ought" in
the typical sense; his view is not that deceptive sex merits punishment due to its abhorrence. Rather, he is saying that if (1)
sexual autonomy is our animating commitment, and (2) conceptual symmetry is our goal, then we "ought" to criminalize sex-bydeception alongside sex-by-coercion no matter how flagrantly
that outcome grates against our felt sense of justice. Again, in
his words:
A coercion rule for rape law would claim its strength from
the principle of sexual autonomy-the idea that people have
a right not to engage in sex they don't consent to. But by ex30
31
32

33
34

Rubenfeld, 122 Yale L J at 1380 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1410-12.
Id at 1411.
Id.

Rubenfeld, 122 Yale L J at 1412 (cited in note 1).
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cluding sexual deception, the coercion compromise conflicts
with sexual autonomy. It can exclude rape-by-deception only by contradicting its own logic.35
But if lawyers are not logicians, so much less are legislative
bodies, and less still the American people. This aspect of our legal universe is a blessing, not a drawback. When it comes to
rape, and undoubtedly many other legal categories, there is no
necessary overlap between "principled" determinations in Professor Rubenfeld's sense-lush abstractions-and the actual
values held by actual members of our polity.
Our nomos wends the latter way. It is a messy, interwoven
world of values; it pulls in many directions at once. Can its complexity be pared down to specific commitments, whose logical
outcomes are then offered up as inescapable in spite of their
practical oblivion? The article answers resoundingly: Yes, we
can do this. And in the hands of an artisan like Professor Rubenfeld, the results can be sharp and elegant, a source of delight for
philosophers. The question is whether those results, originating
as they do from an abstract puzzle, a parlor game, a-quite
principled-conceit, can lay claim to something more.
Regrettably, I think not.

35

Id at 1412.

